

Course Code: <b>IPM101</b>	
Module Name: <b>Understanding Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century</b>	
Academic Year and Term: 2017-18, Term I	
Dr. Alexander Lanoszka <b>Office:</b> Rhind D522 <b>Office Hours:</b> Tuesdays, 13:00-14:50 <b>Email:</b> <a href="mailto:Alexander.Lanoszka@city.ac.uk">Alexander.Lanoszka@city.ac.uk</a>	<b>Meetings:</b> Wednesdays, 12:00–13:50 <b>Location:</b> Rhind D112 <b>Twitter:</b> #IPM101

## Module Description

This module aims to provide M.A. students with an advanced and comprehensive overview of international security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. We will examine why states might conflict militarily with each other; how they compete for security, prevent aggression, and keep the peace; and what military technologies do they strive to acquire in response to their (perceived) threat environments (and why).

We will take a traditional (or classical) approach to understanding international security—meaning that we will prioritise the state as a central actor in international security and take seriously the defence acquisition efforts that states undertake. This approach is useful for developing a baseline level of understanding how states generate security for themselves. Only thereupon can one properly challenge the reasoning and morality of such undertakings in a critical manner.

Please review the enclosed material for more information on learning outcomes, teaching pattern and timetable, assessment, coursework submission, and readings.

## Learning Outcomes

On successful completion of this module, students will be expected to be able to:

### *Knowledge and Understanding*

- Demonstrate an in-depth understanding of key concepts and issues within the field of international security

- Demonstrate knowledge of the different theories that have been used to explain facts of international conflict
- Show awareness of the challenges confronting international actors in handling crisis situations

### *Skills*

- Distinguish empirical and normative statements from each other
- Define abstract concepts and apply them with consistency and rigor when making sense of complex issues that involve war and peace
- Understand deterrence theory
- Formulate clear arguments in written and oral format
- Justify your own positions with evidence-based arguments on topics relating to conflict and peace
- Demonstrate the importance of IT and time management skills

### *Values and Attitudes*

- Demonstrate tolerance towards the opinions of your colleagues
- Develop empathy for those whose opinions you do not share
- Produce written materials that indicate in a precise and honest the nature of your work with proper attribution to the work of others
- Show consideration for the rules and regulations of the University

## **Teaching Pattern and Seminar**

This module is for one term with two contact hours per week. At the beginning of each session, I will offer a brief lecture that introduces the key issues, puzzles, and concepts for that week. These lectures are not substitutes for doing the readings themselves. Under no circumstance can students rely on lectures to be anything more than introductory guide to the subject material. Following the lecture we will

open the meeting to discussion of the various materials raised in the readings that week as if it were a seminar.

In general, good participation in the seminar component entails the following:

- **Carefully reading and understanding the assigned texts before coming to the session:** Much of our discussion will be based on the assigned readings. Because citing specific passages and claims will be necessary to support an argument, you must be familiar with the material. I strongly recommend that you prepare a one page “cheat sheet” for each reading that summarises its main points.
- **Coming prepared to raise questions you have about the material and to express your opinions about the author’s arguments:** Critical thinking goes beyond simple comprehension. It involves placing the arguments in their contexts and evaluating their strengths and weaknesses. To like or to dislike a piece is insufficient. As important as your gut reactions, you must back your arguments with evidence and logic. Any lack of understanding regarding a certain topic in the lectures and readings should be raised during the first part of tutorial. Chances are that if you have difficulty grasping a concept, then someone else is facing that same difficulty as well. After all, much of this module centres on sophisticated scholarship produced in strategic studies, political science, and history.
- **Listening attentively to your classmates and responding respectfully to their comments:** The seminars involve me moderating and facilitating an informed discussion among students. For meetings to be effective, please listen to the points that other students are making rather than simply waiting to make your next comment. Vigorous disagreement is a major part of the academic world, but students must maintain a respectful, civil, and collegial tone. Personal attacks have no place here.
- **Other points of courtesy:** Please avoid side conversations, arrive on time, and do not leave early unless you have spoken with me before the beginning of the tutorial. I understand that many would like to use cell phones to retrieve notes and readings, but I would suggest that you use an alternative device because

cell phone use in the classroom is very distracting and may be interpreted—rightly or wrongly on my part—as discourteous.

Most importantly, have fun! Our meetings are meant to offer an opportunity for engaging intellectually with your peers. Play the devil’s advocate or adopt positions that you otherwise would find disagreeable. Do not be shy about asking questions. Moreover, engaging in a critical but collegial dialogue with your classmates will force you to be articulate and clear in your arguments. Sometimes you might even concede that your argument is wrong. To paraphrase John Stuart Mill, even if you stand by your argument at the end of the debate, defending it forces you to reassess your own premises in a way that *could* reinforce your convictions. Either way, you emerge from the dialogue stronger than before.

## Assessment

Coursework (100% of module mark: minimum pass mark: 50%)

**100% Essay— Deadline: 15 January 2018 at 16:00.**

Students will be given the choice of EITHER:

- A topic from a list of essay titles that will be posted in Moodle.
- Formulating their own essay title

If any student decides to formulate his or her own essay question, then I would need to authorise it. The deadline to complete this process is 6 December 2017.

All students are encouraged to prepare a **short piece providing an outline of the essay**, including **major headings** and an **indicative bibliography**. Feedback will be provided. Please note that this undertaking is **not compulsory** and will **not be assessed**. It is strictly for the benefit of students.

The word limit per written essay is 3,000 words. Students may go over or under by 10%. The word limit runs from the Introduction to the Conclusion of the assignment and will include quotes and footnotes that appear in the body of the assignment. It does not include the following: title page, abstract, diagrams, graphs, images, bibliography, and appendices. I will only mark an assignment up to

the word limit. The part of the assignment that exceeds this limit will not be marked. I will provide feedback and explain that the penalty has been applied.

Other rules governing the formatting of the essay:

- Times 12 or its close equivalent (usually the default setting)
- 1” margins all around
- Double-spacing
- Page numbers—if your first page is the cover page, then set this page number to 0. (In Word, select “Page Numbers” from the “Insert” menu and click on “Format.”)
- Consistent usage of one standard citation style (Harvard, Chicago, MLA, etc.)
- A standard cover page that includes the word count. The cover page should indicate the topic clearly.

## Submission of Coursework

Students should refer to the Programme Handbook for information about coursework. To summarise:

- (a) **Deadlines are final:** Your work should be ready for submission on the deadline. Please do not leave submission until the last minute. Coursework submitted after the deadline will not be marked. If you anticipate that you will be unable to submit your coursework on time due to Extenuating Circumstances, then you must submit an Extenuating Circumstances claim to the School Office by the appropriate deadline in accordance with the School Policy. The onus is on you to submit such a claim in a timely manner. If the Extenuating Circumstances panel accepts your claim, then you will receive an extension and your work will be marked as normal. If it rejects your claim and you submit your work late, then you will receive a mark of 0% for your coursework and you will be required to resit at a later date. Resits are capped at the minimum pass mark for the module (50%). Note that travel delays and IT problems are invalid Extenuating Circumstances.

- (b) **Submission:** Students must submit an electronic copy of the assignment on the module on Moodle by the deadline—this will be your coursework receipt. Do not submit elsewhere. Nor do you submit directly to the teaching staff. *The responsibility is on you to ensure that your coursework is submitted on time and in the correct manner. If you experience any difficulties submitting on Moodle, then please contact your Programme Administrator immediately.*
- (c) **Plagiarism:** By submitting your essay for assessment electronically, you are agreeing to the following declaration: “The work I have submitted is exclusively my own work except where explicitly indicated with quotations and citation. I have read and understood the statement on plagiarism contained in the School Handbook and understand that plagiarism is a serious academic offence and could result in my exclusion from the University.” If you are unsure whether you are paraphrasing properly, then at least provide the full citation and have all directly quoted passages in quotation marks. *All written work will be submitted electronically via Turnitin.*
- (d) **Assistance:** In case you need help with referencing or essay written, then please refer yourself to your Programme Handbook. The Student Centre also provides a series of workshops to help students develop study skills. You can email them at the following address: [academiclearningsupport@city.ac.uk](mailto:academiclearningsupport@city.ac.uk). You can find further details of the support available on their website: <http://www.city.ac.uk/studentcentre>.

## Office Hours

Drop-in office hours are on Tuesdays, from 13:00-14:50 at D522. No appointment is necessary but I would suggest bringing something to read in case you have to wait. Please let me know if this time does not work with your schedule so that we can arrange an alternative appointment. I will notify you of any changes to my office hours schedule via a class email on Moodle.

## Twitter

Over the course of the term I might tweet relevant articles that bear on the subjects and issues raised in this module. Tweeted articles are not required readings—they serve to complement the material. I will be using the hashtag **#IPM101**.

## Letter Writing Requests

Absolutely DO NOT put my name down as a reference without asking for my permission first. I strongly encourage all students contemplating further postgraduate studies to consult with me first. Please note that I have very specific guidelines about letter writing. Read the document first before approaching me. Doing so will save everyone time and energy.

<http://www.alexlanoszka.com/LanoszkaPolicy.pdf>

## Email Confirmation and Communication

Once you have read through this syllabus, please send me an email with subject line “IPM101: Syllabus Read”. In this email, state your name, your reasons for enrolling in this module, previous modules that may be relevant, and statement of origin. The email should be no longer than four sentences. *Please note that all emails sent to me should include “IPM101” at the beginning of the subject line. Responses could take up to 1-2 business days (no weekends). If you have not received a response from me after 2 business days, then please resend your email.*

Please note that all emails sent to me must have “IPM101” at the beginning of the subject line. Responses could take up to 1-2 business days (no weekends). If you have not received a response after 2 business days, then please resend your email. If you anticipate that answering your email would take me more than five minutes, then I would invite you to meet me during office hours instead. As per university policy, I do NOT respond to emails that are not sent from your [city.ac.uk](http://city.ac.uk) account.

# SCHEDULE

<b>Week</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Session Topic</b>
1	4/10/17	Security: Studying It, Wanting It
2	11/10/17	Strategy and Strategic Interaction
3	18/10/17	Why Do Wars Take Place?
4	25/10/17	The First World War as a Case Study
5	1/11/17	Humanitarian Intervention
<b>Reading Week</b>		
7	15/11/17	Forms of Military Power: Land, Sea, and Air
8	22/11/17	Forms of Military Power: Nuclear Weapons
9	29/11/17	Forms of Military Power: Terrorism and Insurgency
10	6/12/17	Forms of Military Power: Drone Warfare
11	13/12/17	Forms of Military power: Information Warfare
<b>Research Essay Due: 15 January 2018</b>		



# Reading List and Module Schedule

Recommended readings marked with \* are *strongly* recommended.

## Week 1: What is Security and How Will We Study It?

In this session we will address why states want what we call security and what approach we will use to understand international security. We will review how the study of international security has evolved since the Second World War.

### Required:

Stephen Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 35, no. 2 (1991): 211-239.

Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, "Uncertainty," in *Security Studies: An Introduction*, ed. Paul D. Williams (London: Routledge, 2008): 133–141.

David A. Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends Versus Old Tendencies," *World Politics*, vol. 31, no. 2 (1979): 161-194.

### **Weekly page count: 86**

### Recommended:

\*Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009): 8-19.

David A. Baldwin, "The Concept of Security," *Review of International Studies*, vol. 23, no. 1 (1997): 5-26.

Mohammed Ayoob, "The Security Problematic of the Third World," *World Politics*, vol. 43, no. 1 (1990): 257-283.

## **Week 2: Strategy and Strategic Behaviour**

Devising strategy involves more than just outlining a wish list of desirable things —it requires an understanding of how to optimise constrained resources in a world marked by competition, uncertainty, and conflicting values. We will examine basic concepts such as coercion, brute force, deterrence theory, and coercive bargaining. We will also discuss why states sometimes have difficulty in being consistent and clear in pursuing strategies as well as issuing threats and promises.

Note that the readings this week are denser than usual. Come prepared to ask questions so that you will grasp most of the material by the end of our meeting.

### Required:

Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966): 1-34.

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Ralph D. Sawyer (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1994): 127-150.

Hal Brands, *What Good is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015): 1-16.

Richard Ned Lebow “Redesigning Strategies of Coercive Bargaining,” *Global Dialogue*, vol. 3 (2001): 119-32.

### **Weekly Page Count: 88**

### Recommended:

\*Bernard Brodie, “A Guide to the Reading of *On War*,” in Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984): 641-711.

\*Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Howard and Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984): 577-640.

John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005).

Azar Gat, *The Origins of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to Clausewitz* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1989).

B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy: The Indirect Approach* (London, UK: Faber and Faber, 1954).

Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981 [1960]).

### **Week 3: Why Do Wars Take Place?**

We study international security because we want to understand why wars take place—preferably to make sure that they do not happen. Why then do wars occur? Why can states not peacefully resolve their differences so as to avoid paying the (potentially high) costs associated with war? We will review some classic explanations for why wars take place (i.e. information asymmetry; commitment problems; issue indivisibility; spiral model). We will also probe as to whether democracies are more adept in managing their conflicts.

#### Required Readings:

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984): 78-89; 113-123.

Dan Reiter, “Exploring the Bargaining Model of War,” *Perspectives on Politics*, vol. 1, no. 1 (2003): 27-33.

James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations of War,” *International Security*, vol. 49, no. 3 (1995): 379-383.

Robert Jervis, “Offense, Defense, and the Security Dilemma,” in *International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, 12th ed.*, eds. Robert Art and Robert Jervis (Pearson, 2015): 79–97.

Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-86,” *American Political Science Review*, vol. 87, no. 3 (1993): 624-627.

Dan Reiter and Allan Stam, “Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory,” *American Political Science Review*, vol. 92, no. 2 (1988): 377-379; 387-388.

Henry Farber and Joanne Gowa, “Politics and Peace,” *International Security*, vol. 20, no. 2 (1994): 123-146.

#### **Weekly Word Count: 87**

#### Recommended Readings:

\*Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," *International Security*, vol. 22, no. 4 (1998): 5-43.

\*Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security*, vol. 20, no. 1 (1995): 5-38.

John Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 2 (1994): 87-105.

## **Week 4: The First World War as a Case Study**

Chinese diplomat Zhou Enlai famously said that we still do not know what to make of the French Revolution. The same can be said of the First World War—a brutal conflict that killed millions, ended long-lasting empires, hastened developments in military technology and medicine, destroyed exorbitant amounts of wealth, and led the way for Adolf Hitler to rise to power in Germany. We will examine this war in light of the explanations of war we reviewed in Week 3. We will tackle such questions as: why did the war start at all (in 1914)?; why was it so bloody?; and why did it last as long (or as short) as it did?

### Required Readings:

Fritz Fischer, *World Power or Decline: The Controversy over Germany's Aims in the First World War* (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 1974): 3-19.

Stephen Van Evera, "Why Cooperation Failed in 1914," *World Politics*, vol. 38, no. 1 (1985): 80-117.

Scott D. Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability," *International Security*, vol. 11, no. 2 (1986): 151-175.

Alexander Lanoszka and Michael Hunzeker, "Rage of Honor: Entente Indignation and the Lost Chance for Peace in the First World War," *Security Studies*, vol. 24, no. 4 (2015): 662-667.

### **Weekly Page Count: 86**

### Recommended Readings:

\*Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," *International Organization*, vol. 44, no. 2 (1990): 137-168.

\*Christopher Clark, *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914* (London, UK: Penguin, 2012).

Holger H. Herwig, "Germany and the 'Short-War' Illusion: Toward a New Interpretation," *The Journal of Military History*, vol. 66, no. 3 (2002): 681-694.

Michael Howard, *The First World War: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007).\*

Keir A. Lieber, "The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory," *International Security*, vol. 32, no. 2 (2007): 155-191.

Margaret MacMillan, *The War that Ended Peace: How Europe Abandoned Peace for the First World War* (London, UK: Profile, 2014).

Jack Snyder, "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," *International Security*, vol. 9, no. 1 (1984): 108-146.

\*Marc Trachtenberg, "The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914," *International Security*, vol. 15, no. 3 (1990): 120-150.\*

Barbara Tuchman, *The Guns of August* (New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 1962).

Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," *International Security*, vol. 9, no. 1 (1984): 58-107.

Marc Trachtenberg, Robert Jervis, Dale C. Copeland, and Stephen A. Schuker, "New Light on 1914?" H-Diplo Forum 16, <https://issforum.org/forums/newlight1914>, 5 September 2017.

## **Week 5: Humanitarian Intervention**

Since the end of the Cold War humanitarian interventions have become more common. States have participated in more and more missions intended to manage ongoing conflicts, to resolve ethnic tensions; to prevent humanitarian disasters; to curb human rights abuses; or to overthrow regimes that commit genocides and other crimes against humanity. How then can states balance the norms of political sovereignty with human rights concerns? Or are such efforts illusory if we have reason to believe that states engage in 'altruistic causes' to serve their own self-interests? Is rescuing civilian populations under duress a moral imperative? What are the risks and challenges that confront humanitarian intervention?

### Required Readings:

Samantha Power, "Bystanders to Genocide: Why the United States Let the Rwandan Tragedy Happen," *The Atlantic Monthly* (September 2001): 84-108.

Edward N. Luttwak, "Give War a Chance," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 78, no. 4 1999: 36-44.

Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, "The Responsibility to Protect," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 6 (2002): 99-110.

Virginia Page Fortna, "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace?: International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War," *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 48, no. 2 (2004): 269-276; 288.

Barbara F. Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," *International Organization*, vol. 51, no. 3 (1997): 335-364.

### **Weekly Word Count: 85**

### Recommended Readings:



Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1996).

Timothy Crawford, "Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War: Why the Holbrook Agreement Failed," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 116, no. 4 (2001): 499-523.

Alan Kuperman, *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2001).

Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000).

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## **Week 6: Reading Week**

## **Week 7: Forms of Military Power—Land, Sea, and Air**

States invest in military power to boost their sense of security. Yet we can breakdown these investments into different categories. We will start by examining the reasons why states develop capabilities on the ground, on the water, and in the air. What are the contrasting strengths and weaknesses of ground power, sea power, and air power? For example, what does ground power do better or worse than sea power? We will also explore why some countries specialise in some capabilities and not others.

Chinese military acquisition efforts will be our case study for the seminar.

### Required Readings:

Stephen Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006): 28-51.

Barry M. Gough, “Maritime Strategy: The Legacies of Mahan and Corbett as Philosophers of Sea Power,” *The RUSI Journal*, vol. 133, no. 4 (1988): 55-62.

Robert Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996): 55-86.

## **Weekly Page Count: 64 + China readings**

### Recommended Readings:

Tami Davis Biddle, “British and American Approaches to Strategic Bombing: Their Origins and Implementation in the World War II Combined Bombing Offensive,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 18, no. 1 (1995): 91-144.

Tami Davis Biddle, “Dresden 1945: Reality, History, and Memory,” *Journal of Military History*, vol. 72, no. 2 (2008): 413-450.

Alexander Downes, *Targeting Civilians in War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011): 115-155.

Michael Allen Hunzeker and Alexander Lanoszka, "Landpower and American Credibility," *Parameters*, vol. 45, no. 4 (2015-16): 17-26.

\*Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, "Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally Against the Leading Global Power?" *International Security*, vol. 35, no. 1 (2010): 7-43.

Response: David W. Blagden, Jack S. Levy, and William R. Thompson, "Sea Powers, Continental Powers, and Balancing Theory," *International Security*, vol. 36, no. 2 (2011): 190-202.

\*Halford J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," *The Geographical Society*, vol. 23, no. 4 (1904): 421-437.

John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).

John B. Hattendorf, "The Idea of a "Fleet in Being" in Historical Perspective," *Naval War College Review*, vol. 67, no. 1 (2014): 43-60.

Alfred T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783* (Dover, 1987 [1890]).

Julian Corbett, *Principles of Maritime Strategy* (Dover Books, 2004): 49-83.

\*Caitlin Talmadge, *The Dictator's Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015): 12-40.

## **Week 8: Forms of Military Power—Nuclear Weapons**

Why might states find nuclear weapons as attractive policy or military instruments? Are they “shiny” objects that states acquire to indulge their desire for prestige? Or do nuclear weapons serve such rational ends like deterrence and coercion? What is the nuclear revolution? Has there actually been one?

US nuclear acquisition efforts will be our case study in seminar.

### Required Readings:

Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989): 1-45.

Keir A. Lieber, *War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics over Technology* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005): 123-148.

### **Weekly Word Count: 71**

### Recommended Readings:

Harold A. Feiveson, Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, and Frank N. von Hippel, *Unmaking the Bomb: A Fissile Material Approach to Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014): 21-42.

Frank J. Gavin, *Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012).

\*Matthew Kroenig, “Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes,” *International Organization*, vol. 67, no. 1 (2013): 141-171.

\*Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd Sechser, “Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail,” *International Organization*, vol. 67, no. 1 (2013): 173-195.

Vipin Narang, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).

Scott D. Sagan, *The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

\*Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” *International Security*, vol. 21, no. 3 (1996-1997): 54-86.

Caitlin Talmadge, “Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States,” *International Security*, vol. 41, no. 4 (2007): 50-92.

## **Session 9: Forms of Military Power—Terrorism and Insurgency**

Why do some political groups adopt terrorism or insurgency tactics? How can states respond to them successfully (and morally)? To what extent has the practice of terrorism evolved since the end of the Second World War? In examining these questions, we will assess how states—democracies and autocracies—can meet such challenges. We will also explore the moral and ethical dilemmas that often emerge when states fight terrorist organisations.

### Required Readings:

Martha Crenshaw, “The Debate over “New” vs. “Old” Terrorism,” in *Values and Violence: 4*, ed. Ibrahim A. Karawan (Springer Netherlands, 2008): 117-136.

David A. Lake, “Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century,” *Dialog-IO*, vol. 1, no. 1 (2002): 15-29.

Audrey K. Cronin, “How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups,” *International Security*, vol. 31, no. 1 (2006): 7-9 and 17-32.

Mao Zedong, *On Guerilla Warfare*, ed. Samuel Griffith (BN Publishing, 2007): 41-50; 58-65.

James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” *American Political Science Review*, vol. 97, no. 1 (2003): 75-82; 88-89.

### **Weekly Word Count: 82**

### Recommended Readings:

Jacqueline L. Hazelton, “The “Hearts and Minds” Fallacy: Violence, Coercion, and Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare,” *International Security*, vol. 42, no. 1 (2017): 80-113.

\*Christopher Blattman and Edward Miguel, “Civil War,” *Journal of Economic Literature*, vol. 48, no. 1 (2010): 3-57.

Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2011): 1-29 (chapter 1).

\*Jeff Goodwin and Theda Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," *Politics and Society*, vol. 17 (1989): 489-507.

Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, "Who Fights?: The Determinants of Participants in Civil War," *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 52, no. 2 (2008): 436-455.

Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Political Violence* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

John A. Nagl, *Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* (London, UK: Praeger, 2002).

\*James C. Scott, "Everyday Forms of Resistance," *Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 4 (1989): 33-62.

Paul Staniland, *Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014): 1-14 (chapter 1).

Podcast on Britain, Counterinsurgency, and the Challenges of Modern Warfare with David Ucko. Available online: <http://advanced.jhu.edu/blog/podcast-britain-and-the-challenges-of-modern-warfare/>

## **Week 10: Forms of Military Power—Drone Warfare**

The Obama administration expanded the use of drones to pursue military objectives in fighting insurgents and terrorist organisations. What are the advantages of using drones as compared to other military technologies? Has drone warfare been successful? What are the political, moral, and ethical issues involved in drone warfare? What can be done about them?

### Required Readings:

Daniel Byman, “Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington’s Weapon of Choice,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 92, no. 4 (2013): 32-43.

Shashank Joshi and Aaron Stein, “Emerging Drone Nations,” *Survival*, vol. 55, no. 5 (2013): 53-78.

Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli, “The Diffusion of Drone Warfare? Industrial, Organization, and Infrastructural Constraints,” *Security Studies*, vol. 25, no. 1 (2016): 50-53 and 62-83.

Michael J. Boyle, “The Costs and Consequences of Drone Warfare,” *International Affairs*, vol. 89, no. 1 (2013): 1-29.

### **Weekly Word Count: 91**

### Recommended Readings:

Michael C. Horowitz, Sarah E. Kreps, and Matthew Fuhrmann, “Separating Fact from Fiction in the Debate over Drone Proliferation,” *International Security*, vol. 41, no. 2 (2016): 7-42.



Daniel Bruntetter and Megan Braun, "The Implications of Drones on the Just War Tradition," *Ethics and International Affairs*, vol. 25, no. 3 (2011): 337-358.

Avery Plaw and Matthew S. Fricker, "Tracking the Predators: Evaluating the US Drone Campaign in Pakistan," *International Studies Perspectives*, vol. 3, no. 4 (2012): 344-365.

Brian Glynn Williams, "The CIA's Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004-2010: The History of an Assassination Campaign," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, vol. 33, no. 10 (2010): 871-892.

Leila Hudson, Colin S. Owens, and Matt Flannes, "Drone Warfare: Blowback from the New American Way of War," *Middle East Policy*, vol. 18, no. 3 (2011): 122-132.

Jacqueline L. Hazelton, "Drones: What are They Good For?" *Parameters*, vol. 42, no. 4/1 (2012): 29-33.

## **Week 11: Forms of Military Power: Information Warfare**

Much has been made about how technological developments of the last thirty years have reshaped warfare. Many security analysts argue that the nature of war is undergoing a radical transformation thanks to improvements in telecommunications, computing power, and information processing. Are such assertions valid? We will examine information warfare—whether it is waged in cyberspace through hacking and malware or in public discourse via propaganda.

### Required:

Thomas Rid, “Cyber War Will Not Take Place,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 35, no. 1 (2013): 5-29.

John Stone, “Cyber War *Will* Take Place!” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 36, no. 1 (2014): 101–107.

Ivanka Barzashka, “Are Cyber-Weapons Effective?: Assessing Stuxnet’s Impact on the Iranian Enrichment Programme,” *The RUSI Journal*, vol. 158, no. 2 (2013): 48-56.

Rod Thornton, “The Changing Nature of Modern Nature,” *The RUSI Journal*, vol. 160, no. 4 (2015): 40-48.

Martin Kragh and Sebastian Åsberg, “Russia’s Strategy for Influence through Diplomacy and Active Measures,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* (2017). DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1273830>.

### **Weekly Word Count: 89**

### Recommended:

\*Erik Gartzke, “The Myth of Cyberwar: Bring War in Cyberspace Back,” *International Security*, vol. 38, no. 2 (2013): 41-73.

\*Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay, “Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace,” *Security Studies*, vol. 24, no. 2 (2015): 316-348.

\*Lucas Kello, “The Meaning of the Cyber Revolution: Perils to Theory and Statecraft,” *International Security*, vol. 38, no. 2 (2013): 7-40.

William J. Lynn III, “Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 89, no. 5 (2010): 97-108.

Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor, *Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

\*Michael C. Horowitz, “Coming Next in Military Tech,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 70, no. 1 (2014): 54-62.

Alexander Lanoszka, “Russian Hybrid Warfare and Extended Deterrence in Eastern Europe,” *International Affairs*, vol. 92, no. 1 (2016): 175-190.