

Course Code: <b>PSCI 355</b>	
Course Name: <b>Russia and Its Neighbours</b>	
Academic Year and Term: 2019-2020, Autumn Semester	
Lectures: Tuesdays and Thursdays, 16:00-17:20~ at Hagey Hall 334	
<b>Dr. Alexander Lanoszka</b> Hagey Hall, 349 <a href="mailto:alexander.lanoszka@uwaterloo.ca">alexander.lanoszka@uwaterloo.ca</a> Office Hours: Thurs., 13:00-15:00	<b>Evaluation Criteria:</b> <b>10%</b> Participation <b>20%</b> Policy Memorandum <b>5%</b> Short Version of Policy Memorandum <b>15%</b> Take-Home Midterm <b>25%</b> Crisis Memorandum <b>5%</b> Short Version of Crisis Memorandum <b>5%</b> Crisis Presentation <b>10%</b> Crisis Simulation Participation <b>5%</b> Short Post-Crisis Memorandum

## Course Description

Substantively, this course is about the political relations between Russia and its many neighbors in the Northern Hemisphere, both past and present. More broadly, this course is about strategy and constrained decision-making, while using issues and themes in Eurasian politics and histories as key case studies for thinking through political problems.

We will tackle a range of topics that include nationalism and ethnicity, nuclear weapons, popular uprisings, energy security, and authoritarianism.

The capstone assessment for this course is a NATO crisis simulation held later in the semester. Classroom participation will also be assessed.

## Pedagogical Approach

Classes will mostly consist of lectures, supported by PowerPoint presentations made available to students before each class. On November 24 and 26, students

will participate in a mock crisis in NATO-Russian relations, for which they will make advance preparations by way of memoranda writing. Students are responsible for keeping up-to-date with the lecture readings and are encouraged to participate actively in class discussions in a respectful and constructive manner.

For my part, I promise to provide students with the tools necessary to succeed academically whether it is by giving them clear requirements for assignments or by giving them detailed and timely feedback. I will try to devote at least 15-20 minutes for discussion at the end of each lecture, although sometimes this goal will be difficult to fulfill. Doing so ensures that students have a grasp of the lecture's material. It will also give them an opportunity to ask questions that they might have, whether with respect to my lecture, to the assigned readings, or to current events that may be relevant that week. A discussion forum is also available on the LEARN site in which you can submit clarifying questions, anonymously or not. I must emphasize that if you are confused about something, then at least one of your classmates shares the same confusion. As such, do not hesitate to ask questions, whether in class or online!

# Assessment

## 10% Participation

I expect students to participate in discussions regarding the class material and weekly readings. As such, I will evaluate students based on the frequency and quality of their interventions. Students will receive something between 7 and 10 if they come to all meetings and make an intervention in the classroom at least two-thirds of the time. The quality of the intervention also matters such that, contrary to Joseph Stalin, quantity does not have a quality all of its own. Indeed, a tendency to speak over your classmates in an attempt to dominate or shut down discussion will result in a subtraction of your grades. Students will receive 4-6 if they miss more than the minimum acceptable meetings (without proper documentation) and/or have sporadic interventions over the course of the term. Students will receive 1-3 if they miss class often and remain silent over the course of the term. You have to be a complete no-show to get 0.

I understand that some of you might not be comfortable speaking in front of your peers, but I strive to make the environment as open and comfortable for you to contribute. Please consult me if you wish to discuss this issue further in private. If nothing else, ask clarifying questions because—as mentioned—I guarantee someone else has the same question.

I also understand that life “happens.” You are entitled to miss two sessions with no questions asked, provided that these sessions are not those in which we have the simulations. I will be tracking attendance.

## 20% Policy Memorandum (6 pp.)

There is no midterm exam, but you do have to write a six-page policy memorandum that touches on one of these questions.

- To what extent should Estonian/Latvian/Lithuanian/Polish/Ukrainian [choose one] nationalist demands be accommodated or rejected? (1900s Imperial Russia)
- What preparations, if any, should be made to head off a potential Nazi surprise attack? (pre-1941 Soviet Union)

- To what extent should a nuclear arsenal be built? What mixture of weapons is most appropriate and/or feasible? (1950s-1960s Soviet Union)
- How should the Soviet Union, if at all, compete militarily and/or economically with the United States? (1970s-1980s Soviet Union)
- Should the local Russian minority in Estonia/Latvia [choose one] be accommodated politically, and if so, how? (early 1990s Baltic states)
- Should Ukraine keep its inherited stockpile of nuclear weapons? (early 1990s Ukraine)
- How should Russia deal with the insurgency in the Caucasus, especially the one in Chechnya? (early-mid 1990s Russia)

Use the relevant course readings as the basis for your research to write your policy paper. A good (B+/A-) policy paper will feature, among other things, at least three additional academic sources. An excellent (A/A+) one will feature, among other things, at least five additional ones.

If you have an alternative question to propose, then you must consult me. Note: any proposed question must be based on lecture topics 2-9.

The policy paper is due on 11 October at 23:59 EST via a designated dropbox on LEARN. Starting 00:00 on 12 October. I will assign a penalty to late memoranda 10% per day, including weekends.

### **5% Brief Policy Memorandum (1.5 pp.)**

In government, no one has time to read long memoranda. And by long, I mean documents that are longer than about 1.5 pages. You will provide a short succinct version of your 6 page policy memorandum on the same deadline as when the policy memorandum is due. In this document, you must only convey the essence of the problem and a quick run-down of the solution and its merits. This memorandum will be free of citations (since the longer one will have them).

Students are to submit their brief policy memoranda in Word format by **23:59** on 11 October—yes, the same day as the long version—to a designated dropbox folder created on LEARN. This dropbox folder will be different from the one used

for the longer versions. Starting 00:00 on 12 October. I will assign a penalty to late memoranda 10% per day, including weekends.

### **15% Take-Home Midterm (4-5 pp.)**

This take-home midterm will be based on the course material drawn from lectures 10 through 16. I expect that students will reference at least some of the readings from those days in answering any question asked of them. The midterm exam will be given one week before the deadline.

### **TOTAL 50% CAPSTONE ASSESSMENT**

This is the capstone assessment for this class. It involves five parts.

#### **Part One: 30% Policy Memorandum (7-9 pp.)**

Students will write a memorandum for the North Atlantic Council. Each student will represent a different NATO member and offer its national perspective. In this memorandum, the student will first discuss their country's diplomatic history with Russia. They will outline, for example, any major conflicts and disputes, why they were fought, any major episodes of joint cooperation, which interests in general are shared, and which interests are irreconcilable or conflictual. As for the crisis scenario, students must illuminate the national interests at play for their country in the crisis scenario. The student must also elaborate on their country's stance—specifically, the student must explain what appropriate military and/or diplomatic measures that the Alliance should take. Students should anticipate potential objections from other countries as well as offer objections of their own to the approaches taken by other Allies.

*Policy memoranda should cite at least one reading, recommended or required, from at least four separate lectures. Use page specific quotations as frequently as possible.*

Memoranda must be between 8 to 10 pages long (excluding the title page and the bibliography), typed in a 12-point font, and double spaced. They are to be submitted electronically in Word format by **23:59 EST** on November 22 to

designated dropbox created on LEARN. Starting 00:00 on November 23, late memoranda will be assigned a penalty of 10% per day, including weekends.

### **Part Two: 5% Brief Policy Memorandum (1.5 pp.)**

Exactly the same as for the first policy memorandum. This documents must not be longer than about 1.5 pages. You will provide a short succinct version of your 8-10 page policy memorandum. In this document, you must only convey the essence of the problem and a quick run-down of the solution and its merits. This memorandum will be free of citations (since the longer one will have them).

Students are to submit their brief policy memoranda in Word format by **23:59 EST** on November 21 —yes, the same day as the long version—to a designated dropbox folder created on LEARN. This dropbox folder will be different from the one used for the longer versions. Starting 00:00 on November 22, I will sign a penalty to late memoranda 10% per day, including weekends.

### **Part Three: 5% Presentation (2 mins.)**

On November 26, students will begin the meeting by presenting their memoranda on the crisis in class. Address your fellow Allies and please outline your country's position (interests at stake, preferred courses of action, what resources it might be willing to provide [if any]) on the matter.

### **Part Four: 10% Crisis Participation**

Once students have concluded all their presentations, we will launch into the Council meeting. In that first session on November 24, and the second on November 26, in their capacities as state representatives, students will be negotiating with each other in order to find a common position on the matter. By the end of the November 26 meeting, students should have agreed (unanimously) to a common NATO policy response. It is possible that no agreement will be reached; failure will not affect participation grades so long as there is a bona fide effort to reach an Alliance-based agreement.

Between November 26 and 28, negotiations will remain active via the LEARN discussion board. Participation in these online discussions will count towards your crisis participation grade. There will also be a survey made available after November 26 that will collect data on how you—as a national representative—perceived aspects of the crisis.

**Part Five: 5% Post-Crisis Memorandum (1.5 page)**

The final memorandum is a report to your national capital that explains the implications of the crisis and its outcome for your country's national security. This is not a self-assessment of your performance. Rather, you must report on the outcome and explain the extent to which the Alliance outcome reached (or lack thereof) has furthered or hindered your country's strategy.

Students are to submit their post-crisis memoranda in Word format by **23:59 EST** on 29 November to a designated dropbox folder created on LEARN. This dropbox folder will be different from the one used for the longer versions. Starting 00:00 on November 30, late memoranda will be assigned a penalty of 10% per day, including weekends.

I will eventually provide more instructions in class as well as more details on the crisis scenario.

## Essay Formatting

Other rules governing the formatting of all written work submitted for this course:

- 1” margins all around
- 12 pt font
- Page numbers—if your first page is the cover page, then set this page number to 0. (In Word, select “Page Numbers” from the “Insert” menu and click on “Format.”)
- Consistent usage of one standard citation style (e.g., Chicago, MLA, etc.)
- A standard cover page that includes the word count
- All written work **MUST** be submitted in .doc or .docx format. **NO PDFS!**

Failure to format your essay properly will result in a deduction of your mark.

Note that references and citations must *not* appear in your short policy memos.

## Office Hours

Drop-in office hours are on Thursdays, from 10:00–11:50 at 349 Hagey Hall. No appointment is necessary but I would suggest bringing something to read in case you have to wait. Please let me know if this time does not work with your schedule so that we can arrange an alternative appointment. I will not explain to you what was discussed in any session that you might have missed.

## Letter Writing Requests

Absolutely **DO NOT** put my name down as a reference without asking for my permission first. I strongly encourage all students contemplating further postgraduate studies to consult with me first. Please note that I have very specific guidelines about letter writing. Read the document first before approaching me. Doing so will save everyone time and energy.

<http://www.alexlanoszka.com/LanoszkaPolicy.pdf>



## Email Confirmation and Communication

Once you have read through this syllabus, please send me an email with subject line “**PSCI 355: Syllabus Read**”. In this email, state your name, your reasons for enrolling in this course, and previous courses that may be relevant. The email should be no longer than four sentences.

Please note that all emails sent to me should include “PSCI 355” at the beginning of the subject line. Responses could take up to 1-2 business days (no weekends). If I believe that answering your email would take me more than five minutes to do, then I would invite you to meet me during my office hours instead. If you have not received a response after 2 business days, then please resend your email. I will **ONLY** respond to emails that are sent from your [uwaterloo.ca](mailto:uwaterloo.ca) account.

## Twitter

I often tweet on issues relating to Russian foreign policy, Baltic regional security, and European security. During the term I might tweet relevant articles that bear directly on the issues raised in this course. Tweeted articles are not required reading. I am indifferent as to whether you follow me on Twitter.

## Academic Integrity

In order to maintain a culture of academic integrity, members of the University of Waterloo are expected to promote honesty, trust, fairness, respect and responsibility.

- (a) **Discipline:** A student is expected to know what constitutes academic integrity, to avoid committing academic offences, and to take responsibility for her/his actions. A student who is unsure whether an action constitutes an offence, or who needs help in learning how to avoid offences (e.g., plagiarism, cheating) or about “rules” for group work/collaboration should seek guidance from the course professor, academic advisor, or the Undergraduate Associate Dean. When misconduct has been found to have occurred, disciplinary penalties will be imposed under Policy 71 - Student Discipline. For information on categories of offences and types of penalties,

students should refer to Policy 71 - Student Discipline at <http://www.adm.uwaterloo.ca/infosec/Policies/policy71.htm>.

- (b) **Grievance:** A student who believes that a decision affecting some aspect of her/his university life has been unfair or unreasonable may have grounds for initiating a grievance. Read Policy 70 - Student Petitions and Grievances, Section 4 at <http://www.adm.uwaterloo.ca/infosec/Policies/policy70.htm>.
- (c) **Appeals:** A student may appeal the finding and/or penalty in a decision made under Policy 70 - Student Petitions and Grievances (other than regarding a petition) or Policy 71 - Student Discipline if a ground for an appeal can be established. Read Policy 72 - Student Appeals, <http://www.adm.uwaterloo.ca/infosec/Policies/policy72.htm> See also: Student Appeals at <https://uwaterloo.ca/arts/current-undergraduates/student-support/artsundergraduate-office>.
- (d) **Turnitin.com:** Plagiarism detection software (Turnitin) will be used to screen assignments in this course. This step serves to verify that use of all material and sources in assignments is documented. In the first week of the term, details will be provided about the arrangements for the use of Turnitin in this course. If you do not wish to have your assignments submitted to Turnitin, an alternative arrangement between you and I can be worked out where your work can still be rigorously assessed to ensure its academic integrity.

## **Accommodation for Students with Disabilities**

The AccessAbility Services (AS) Office (Needles Hall, Room 1401) collaborates with all academic departments to arrange appropriate accommodations for students with disabilities without compromising the academic integrity of the curriculum. If you require academic accommodations to lessen the impact of your disability, please register with the AS Office at the beginning of each academic term.

**NOTA BENE: THIS SYLLABUS IS SUBJECT TO MINOR CHANGES. PLEASE REFER TO THE LEARN WEBSITE FOR THE MOST UP-TO-DATE VERSION.**

# SCHEDULE

1	September 5	Introduction: Thinking Strategically in the Russia-Neighbour Context
2	September 10	Nationalism: The Tsarist Empire and Its Demise
3	September 12	Surprise Attack: Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union
4	September 17	Nuclear Weapons: Soviet Union in the Early Cold War
5	September 19	The Soviet Collapse I: Causes and Some Consequences
6	September 24	The Soviet Collapse II: Nationalism and Citizenship (The Baltics)
7	September 26	The Soviet Collapse III: Symbolism and Recognition (Ukraine)
8	October 1	The Soviet Collapse IV: Resource Curse and Autocracy (Central Asia)
9	October 3	The Soviet Collapse V: Insurgency (The Caucasus)
10	October 8	NATO Expansion
11	October 10	Enter Vladimir Putin
	October 11	<b>Policy Papers Due at 23:59 EST</b>
12	October 22	Alliance Politics and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War
13	October 24	The Colour Revolutions and the Arab Spring
14	October 29	Ukraine, From Maidan to Novorossiya (1)
15	October 31	Ukraine, From Maidan to Novorossiya (2)
16	November 5	Russian Military Power and Defence Policy
17	November 7	The Baltic States and Belarus
	November 10	<b>Take-Home Midterm (L10-16) Due at 23:59 EST</b>
18	November 12	Germany
19	November 14	The China Factor
	November 19	No Class
	November 21	No Class
	November 22	<b>Crisis Papers Due at 23:59 EST</b>
20x	November 26	Crisis Simulation Day I
21x	November 28	Crisis Simulation Day II
	November 29	<b>Brief Post-Crisis Memorandum Due at 23:59 EST</b>
22	December 3	Post-Crisis Debrief; Discussion of Future Trends

# Reading List and Course Schedule

Recommended readings marked with \* are *strongly* recommended.

## **Session 1: Introduction: Thinking Strategically ...**

In this session we will talk about the goals of this course as well as its assessment components. Do not expect me to review the syllabus at length, however. I will use the lecture to discuss a key theme of this course: strategic thinking and constrained decision-making in the Russia—“neighbour” context.

### *Required Reading:*

Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, *Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001): chapter 1 (Ten Tales of Strategy).

Tim Marshall, *Prisoners of Geography: Ten Maps That Tell You Everything You Need to Know About Global Politics* (2015): chapter 1 (Russia).

## **S. 2: Nationalism: The Tsarist Empire and Its Demise**

Almost all of the issues we will be discussing in this course have their roots in the late 19th and early 20th century. Two key developments stand out. The first is the emergence of nationalist identities in Europe, with ethnic cleavages becoming most pronounced in Central and Eastern Europe; the second is the collapse of the Russian Empire during the First World War and its immediate aftermath.

Lieven refers sometimes to the Second World, an archaic term from the Cold War used to designate the Soviet Union and its satellites in Eastern and Central Europe. The First World comprised the advanced industrial democracies, whereas the Third World consisted of what we call today the Global South or the developing world. Note also that Nicolas II Romanov was the last Russian Emperor and that two revolutions took place in 1917: the “liberal” one in February and the Bolshevik one in October. The Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania led a Commonwealth together for over two-hundred years before its complete dismemberment by Prussia, Russia, and Austria in the three partitions of the late 18th century. The largest insurgency—the January Uprising—in partitioned Poland took place on Russian territory in 1863. Ruthenia is an archaic name for Ukraine.

### Required Reading:

Laura Engelstein, *Russia in Flames: War, Revolution, Civil War, 1914-1921* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2018): 1-27.

Timothy Snyder, “Chapter 2: Lithuania! My Fatherland! (1863-1914),” in *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004): 31-50.

Stephen Van Evera, “Primordialism Lives!” *APSA-CP*, vol. 12, no. 1 (2001): 20-22.

### **L. 3: Surprise Attack: Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union**

Why did complete ideological adversaries come to sign a non-aggression pact? Why did Nazi Germany choose to invade the Soviet Union? Why did Joseph Stalin not act on intelligence warning him that a major German military operation—Operation Barbarossa—was afoot? What has been the legacy of Operation Barbarossa? These questions will be the focus of this session.

#### Required Reading:

Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable,” *World Politics*, vol. 31, no. 1 (1978): 61-89.

Geoffrey Roberts, “Military Disaster as a Function of Rational Political Calculation: Stalin and 22 June 1941,” *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, vol. 42, no. 2 (1993): 313-330.

#### Recommended Reading:

Geoffrey Roberts, “Ideology, Calculation, and Improvisation: Spheres of Influence and Soviet Foreign Policy 1939-1945,” *Review of International Studies*, vol. 25, no. 4 (1999): 655-673.

Roger Moorhouse, “Chapter 8: Riding the Nazi Tiger,” in *The Devil’s Alliance: Hitler’s Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941* (New York: Basic Books, 2014).

Season 10, Episodes 7—9 of *Extra History: The Battle of Kursk* on YouTube. You may access the season [here](#). The entire season is well worth watching.

Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin* (New York: Random House, 2011).

#### **L. 4: Nuclear Weapons: The Soviet Union in the Early Cold War**

This session will examine how nuclear weapons have changed—or have not changed—international politics, with particular focus on the Soviet Union’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and its efforts in managing the Warsaw Pact.

Note that the nuclear revolution is not the appearance of nuclear weapons per se, but the incentives for great power cooperation that should arise once great powers acquire secure second-strike capabilities—that is, that they can absorb a nuclear strike and still be able to launch a retaliatory nuclear strike of their own.

##### Required Reading:

Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989): 1-45.

Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko, “MAD, not MARX: Khrushchev and the Nuclear Revolution,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 41, no. 1-2 (2018): 208-233.

##### Recommended Reading:

David Holloway, “Entering the Nuclear Arms Race: The Soviet Decision to Build the Atomic Bomb, 1939-45,” *Social Studies of Science*, vol. 11, no. 2 (1981): 159-197.

Mark Kramer, “The ‘Lessons’ of the Cuban Missile Crisis for Warsaw Pact Nuclear Operations,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, vol. 5, no. 59 (1995): 110-115.

Alexander Lanoszka, “Nuclear Proliferation and Nonproliferation in the Soviet Alliance System,” *Journal of Global Security Studies*, vol. 3, no. 2 (2018): 217-233.

## **L. 5: The Soviet Collapse (I): Causes and Some Consequences**

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union shortly thereafter took many by surprise. We will examine why the Soviet Union retracted its political and military commitments in Europe towards the late 1980s and early 1990s. This session is the also first of five that will look at the regional consequences of this seismic geopolitical event. Read Kotkin before Wohlforth.

### Required Reading:

Stephen Kotkin, “Chapter 3: The Drama of Reform” in *Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2008): 58-85.

William C. Wohlforth, “Realism and the End of the Cold War,” *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 3 (1994-1995): 91-129.

### Recommended Reading:

Valerie Bunce, “The Empire Strikes Back: The Evolution of the Eastern Bloc from a Soviet Asset to a Soviet Liability,” *International Organization*, vol. 39, no. 1 (1985): 1-46.

Mark Kramer, “The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union (part 1),” *Journal of Cold War Studies*, vol. 5, no. 4 (2003): 178-256.

Richard N. Lebow, “The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism,” *International Organization*, vol. 48, no. 2 (1994): 249-277.



## **L. 6: The Soviet Collapse (II): Nationalism and Citizenship (The Baltics)**

In the second part of the five part series on the Soviet collapse, we look at the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Two themes stand out here: nationalism and citizenship. We will examine how these three countries addressed these thorny issues once they obtained independence.

For local leaders of these new republics, the question of strategic importance is as follows: how do you design citizenship laws that balance between majority and minority rights in a post-imperial environment?

### Required Reading:

W. Rogers Brubaker, "Citizenship Struggles in Soviet Successor States," *International Migration Review*, vol. 26, no. 2 (1992): 269-291.

Jeff Chinn and Lise A. Truex, "The Question of Citizenship in the Baltics," *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 7, no. 1 (1996): 133-147.

Mark R. Beissinger, "Nationalism and the Collapse of Soviet Communism," *Contemporary European History*, vol. 18, no. 3 (2009): 331-347.

### Recommended Reading:

Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "Baltic Nationalism and the Soviet Armed Forces," *Journal of Baltic Studies*, vol. 17, no. 3 (1986): 179-193.

Aadne Aasland, "Citizenship Status and Social Exclusion in Estonia and Latvia," *Journal of Baltic Studies*, vol. 33, no. 1 (2002): 57-77.

Aro Velvet, "Occupied Identities: National Narratives in Baltic Museums of Occupations," *Journal of Baltic Studies*, vol. 42, no. 2 (2011): 189-211.

## **L. 7: The Collapse of the Soviet Union (III): Symbolic Politics and Recognition (Ukraine)**

Moving westward, the third session on the Soviet collapse draws our attention to Ukraine where issues of symbolic politics and recognition assume significance. We will discuss early efforts at nation-state building as well as the decision to relinquish “control” of Soviet legacy nuclear weapons systems.

### Required Reading:

Yaroslav Hrytsak, “National Identities in Post-Soviet Ukraine: The Case of Lviv and Donetsk,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, vol 22 (1998): 263-281.

Mariana Budjeryn, “The Power of the NPT: International Norms and Ukraine’s Nuclear Disarmament,” *The Nonproliferation Review*, vol. 22, no. 2 (2015): 203-237.

### Recommended Reading:

Taras Kuzio, “Borders, Symbolism and Nation-State Building: Ukraine and Russia,” *Geopolitics and International Boundaries*, vol. 2, no. 2 (1997): 36-56.

Oxana Shevel, “The Politics of Memory in a Divided Society: A Comparison of Post-Franco Spain and Post-Soviet Ukraine,” *Slavic Review*, vol. 70, no. 1 (2011): 137-164.

Mark von Hagen, “Does Ukraine have a History?” *Slavic Review*, vol. 54, no. 3 (1995): 658-673.

## **L. 8: The Collapse of the Soviet Union (IV): Resource Curse and Autocracy (Central Asia)**

We will examine in this session why more rigid forms of authoritarianism endured in such of Central Asia. This session will also introduce us to the energy politics that have come to characterise post-Soviet international politics.

### Required Reading:

Michael L. Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" *World Politics*, vol. 53, no. 3 (2001): 325-361.

Pinar Ipek, "The Role of Oil and Gas in Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy," *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 59, no. 7 (2007): 1179-1199.

### Recommended Reading:

Paul Domjan and Matt Stone, "A Comparative Study of Resource Nationalism in Russia and Kazakhstan 2004-2008," *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 62, no. 1 (2010): 35-62.

Paulina Jones Luong, "Politics in the Periphery: Competing Views of Central Asian States and Societies," in *The Transformation of Central Asia: States and Societies from Soviet Rule to Independence*, ed. Paulina Jones Luong (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).

Stephen Blank, "Energy, Economics and Security in Central Asia: Russia and its Rivals," *Central Asian Survey*, vol. 14, no. 3 (1995): 373-406.

Richard L. Wolfel, "North to Astana: Nationalistic Motives for the Movement of the Kazakh(stani) Capital," *Nationalities Paper*, vol. 30, no. 3 (2002): 485-506.

## **L. 9: The Collapse of the Soviet Union (V): Insurgency (The Caucasus)**

The conventional wisdom holds that the collapse of the Soviet Union was largely a peaceful process, yet this view overlooks the violence that characterised the Caucasus when the Soviet state began to shrink. We will look at the various ethnic conflicts and secessionist wars in this mountainous region.

James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 97, no. 1 (2003): 75-82; 88-89.

John Arquilla and Theodore Karasik, "Chechnya: A Glimpse of Future Conflict?" *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, vol. 22, no. 3 (1999): 207-229.

### Recommended Reading:

Jason Lyall, "Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 53, no. 3 (2009): 331-362.

Domitilla Sagramoso, "Violence and Conflict in the Russian North Caucasus," *International Affairs*, vol. 83, no. 4 (2007): 681-705.

Yuri M. Zhukov, "Roads and the Diffusion of Insurgent Violence: The Logistics of Conflict in Russia's North Caucasus," *Political Geography*, vol. 31, no. 3 (2012): 144-156.

Elise Giuliano, "Islamic Identity and Political Mobilisation in Russia: Chechnya and Dagestan Compared," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, vol. 11, no. 2 (2005): 195-220.

Mark Kramer, "The Perils of Counterinsurgency: Russia's War in Chechnya," *International Security*, vol. 29, no. 3 (2005): 5-63.

## **L. 10: NATO Expansion**

Some pundits argue that the present crisis between Russia and the West has its roots in the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation into countries previously under Soviet control. The Russian position holds that the United States promised not to expand NATO. This grievance fuels the Kremlin's continued distrust in the United States. To what extent is this grievance legitimate?

### Required Reading:

Mary Elise Sarotte, "A Broken Promise? What the West Really Told Moscow About NATO Expansion," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 93, no. 5 (2014): 90-97.

Joshua R.I. Shiffrinson, "Deal or No Deal? The End of the Cold War and the US Offer to Limit NATO Expansion," *International Security*, vol. 40, no. 4 (2016): 7-44.

### Recommended Reading:

Mark Kramer, "The Myth of a No-NATO-Enlargement Pledge to Russia," *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 32, no. 2 (2009): 39-61.

James M. Goldgeier, "NATO Expansion: The Anatomy of a Decision," *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 21, no. 1 (1998): 83-102.

Michael E. Brown, "The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion," *Survival*, vol. 37, no. 1 (1995): 34-52.

Nadia Alexandrova Arbatova, "The EU and NATO Enlargement: A Russian View," in *NATO and the European Union: New World, New Europe, New Threats*, ed. Hall Gardner, Routledge, 2017: 115-121.

Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The Unravelling of the Cold War Settlement," *Survival*, vol. 51, no. 6 (2009): 39-62.

## **L. 11: Enter Vladimir Putin**

Putin became the President of the Russian Federation on 31 December 1999, setting in motion significant changes to Russian politics. This session examines his rise to power as well as the system of governance that he has put into place since. We will ponder what are the implications of different theories about his personality and motivations for deterrence.

### Required Reading:

Bettina Renz, "Putin's Militocracy? An Alternative Interpretation of the Siloviki in Contemporary Russian Politics," *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 58, no. 6 (2006): 903-924.

Stephen Kotkin, "The Resistible Rise of Vladimir Putin," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 94 (2015): 140-153.

Elizabeth A. Wood, "Hypermasculinity as a Scenario of Power: Vladimir Putin's Iconic Rule, 1999-2008," *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, vol. 18, no. 3 (2016): 329-350.

### Recommended Reading:

Natalia Morozova, "Geopolitics, Eurasianism and Russian Foreign Policy Under Putin," *Geopolitics*, vol. 14, no. 4 (2009):

Maria Snegovaya, "Is It Time to Drop the F-Bomb on Russia?: Why Putin is almost a Fascist," *World Policy Journal*, vol. 34, no. 1 (2017): 48-53.

Alan Ingram, "Alexander Dugin: Geopolitics and Neo-Fascism in Post-Soviet Russia," *Political Geography*, vol. 20, no. 8 (2001): 1029-1051.

## **L. 12: Alliance Politics and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War**

The five day war between Russia and Georgia was the first European war in the twenty-first century. What happened? One common explanation focuses on alliance politics. Emboldened by U.S. support and the promise of NATO support, Georgia pursued an aggressive foreign policy that set it on a collision course with Russia. For its part, Russia feared that NATO would expand further to include Georgia and so sought to prevent this from happening. Was NATO at fault here? What could have been done differently? How do we weigh the role of the Alliance against other factors that might have induced them to go to war in 2008?

### Required Reading:

Jesse Driscoll and Daniel Maliniak, “With Friends Like These: Brinkmanship and Chain-Ganging in Russia’s Near Abroad,” *Security Studies*, vol. 25, no. 4 (2016): 585-607.

Alexander Lanoszka, “Tangled Up in Rose? Theories of Alliance Entrapment and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War,” *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 39, no. 2 (2018): 234-257.

### Recommended Reading:

Rick Fawn and Robert Nalbandov, “The Difficulties of Knowing the Start of War, in the Information Age: Russia, Georgia and the War over South Ossetia, August 2008,” *European Security*, vol. 21, no. 1 (2012): 57-89.

Roy Allison, “Russia Resurgent? Moscow’s Campaign to ‘Coerce Georgia to Peace’,” *International Affairs*, vol. 84, no. 6 (2008): 1145-1171.

Oksana Antonenko, “A War with no Winners,” *Survival*, vol. 50, no. 5 (2008): 23-36.

Andrei P. Tsygankov and Matthew Tarver-Wahlquist, “Duelling Honors: Power, Identity and the Russia-Georgia Divide,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, vol. 5 (2009): 307-326.

## **L. 13: The Colour Revolutions and the Arab Spring**

What were the Colour Revolutions? How did Russia respond to them? And what explains variation in the responses of the Kremlin to the Colour Revolutions? What effect did the Color Revolutions and the Arab Spring have on the Kremlin?

### Required Reading:

Jeanne L. Wilson, "The Legacy of the Color Revolutions for Russian Politics and Foreign Policy," *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol. 57, no. 2 (2010): 21-36.

Katerina Dalacoura, "The 2011 Uprisings in the Arab Middle East: Political Change and Geopolitical Implications," *International Affairs*, vol. 88, no. 1 (2012): 63-79.

### Recommended Reading:

Thomas Ambrosio, "The Political Success of Russia-Belarus Relations: Insulating Minsk from a Color Revolution," *Demokratizatsiya*, vol.14, no. 3 (2006): 407-434.

Karrie J. Koesel and Valerie J. Bunce, "Diffusion-Proofing: Russian and Chinese Responses to Waves of Popular Mobilisations Against Authoritarian Rulers," *Perspectives on Politics*, vol. 11, no. 3 (2013): 753-768.

Lucan Way, "The Real Causes of the Color Revolutions," *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 19, no. 3 (2008): 55-69.

James Sladden, Becca Wasser, Ben Connable, and Sarah Grand-Clement, *Russia Strategy in the Middle East* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017). Available at: <https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE236.readonline.html>.

David R. Marples, "Color Revolutions: The Belarus Case," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, vol. 39, no. 3 (2006): 351-364.



## **L. 14-15: Ukraine, Maidan to Crimea to *Novorossiya***

Concerns about the Colour Revolutions and the Arab Spring shaped Russian perceptions of the events in Ukraine in late 2013 and early 2014. We retrace what happened between the EU, Viktor Yanukovich, the Maidan movement, and the Kremlin during those fateful months. Thereupon we will examine the war that Ukraine has been fighting in its eastern regions against Russian proxies and forces.

### Required Reading:

Shred Kudelia, "The House that Yanukovich Built," *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 25, no. 3 (2014): 19-34.

Hiski Haukkala, "A Perform Storm, Or What Went Wrong and What Went Right for the EU in Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 68, no. 4 (2016): 653-664.

John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West's Fault: The Liberal Delusions that Provoked Putin," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 93, no. 5 (2014): 77-89.

Valerie Bunce and Aida Hozic, "Diffusion-Proofing and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine," *Demokratizatsiya*, vol. 24, no. 4 (2016): 435-455.

### Recommended Readings:

Andrew Bowen, "Coercive Diplomacy and the Donbas: Explaining Russian Strategy in Eastern Ukraine," *Journal of Strategic Studies* (2017): 1-32.

Roy Allison, "Russian 'Deniable Intervention' in Ukraine: How and Why Russia Broke the Rules," *International Affairs*, vol. 90, no. 6 (2014): 1255-1297.

Marlene Laruelle, "The Three Colors of Novorossiya, or the Russian Nationalist Mythmaking of the Ukrainian Crisis," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 32, no. 1 (2016): 55-74.

John O'Loughlin, Gerard Toal, and Vladimir Kolosov, "The Rise and Fall of 'Novorossiya': Examining Support for a Separatist Geopolitical Imaginary in Southeast Ukraine," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 33, no. 2 (2017): 124-144.

## **L. 16: Russian Military Power and Strategy**

For about a decade, Russia has been undertaking an impressive modernisation program in order to improve the quality of its armed forces. This session reviews the Russian military as well as how leading Russian military theorists conceive of the use of force.

### Required Reading:

Bettina Renz, “Why Russia is Reviving its Conventional Military Power,” *Parameters*, vol. 46, no. 2 (2016): 23-36.

Charles K. Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov Right,” *Military Review*, vol. 96, no. 1 (2016): 30-38.

Katarzyna Zysk, “Escalation and Nuclear Weapons in Russia’s Military Strategy,” *The RUSI Journal*, vol. 163, no. 2 (2018): 1-12.

Matthew Kroenig, “Facing Reality: Getting NATO Ready for a New Cold War,” *Survival*, vol. 57, no. 1 (2015): 49-70.

Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, “Russian Strategic Deterrence,” *Survival*, vol. 58, no. 4 (2016): 7-26.

### Recommended Reading:

Bettina Renz, “Russia and ‘Hybrid Warfare,’” *Contemporary Politics*, vol. 22, no. 3 (2016): 283-300.

Mark Galeotti, “Putin’s Hydra: Inside Russia’s Intelligence Services,” *European Council on Foreign Relations Policy Brief*.

Dmitri Trenin, “The Revival of the Russian Military: How Moscow Reloaded,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 95, no. 3 (2016): 23-29.

Martin Kragh and Sebastian Åsberg “Russia’s Strategy for Influence through Diplomacy and Active Measures,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 40, no. 6 (2017):773-816.

Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2018,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 74, no. 3 (2018): 185-195.

Nikolai N. Sokov, “Why Russia Calls a Limited Nuclear Strike “De-Escalation.”” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (March 13, 2014).

## **L. 17: The Baltic Region and Belarus**

The Baltic countries (and Poland) represent the NATO's northeastern flank—the most vulnerable flank to Russian aggression in the Western alliance. How is it vulnerable? What are the risks of Russian aggression in the region? What role does Russia's singular ally—Belarus—play in these regional dynamics?

### Required Reading:

Alexander Lanoszka, “Russian Hybrid Warfare and Extended Deterrence in Eastern Europe,” *International Affairs*, vol. 92, no. 1 (2016): 175-195.

Kier Giles and Mathieu Boulegue, “Russia's A2/AD Capabilities: Real and Imagined,” *Parameters*, vol. 49, no. 1-2 (2019): 21-36.

Alexander Lanoszka, “The Belarus Factor in European Security,” *Parameters*, vol. 47, no. 4 (2018): 75-84.

### Recommended Reading:

David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, *Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016).

Toms Rostoks and Nora Vanaga, “Latvia's Security and Defence Policy Post-2014,” *Journal on Baltic Security*, vol. 2, no. 2 (201): 71-108.

Deividas Slekys, “Lithuania's Balancing Act,” *Journal on Baltic Security*, vol. 3, no. 2 (2017): 43-54.

Maris Andzans and Viljar Veebel, “Deterrence Dilemma in Latvia and Estonia: Finding the Balance Between External Military Solidarity and Territorial Defence,” *Journal of Baltic Security*, vol. 3, no. 2 (2017): 29-42.

Stephan Frühling and Guillaume Lasconjarias, “NATO, A2/AD, and the Kaliningrad Challenge,” *Survival*, vol. 58, no. 2 (2016): 95-116.

## **L. 18: Germany**

Perhaps no European country is as important of a neighbour of Russia's than Germany. As such, Germany gets its own session. This country examines Germany's foreign policy towards Russia and explores why it has been torn between cooperation and conflict since the 1950s before addressing present controversies like Nord Stream 2.

### Required Reading:

Alexander Rahr, "Germany and Russia: A Special Relationship," *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 30, no. 2 (2007): 137-145.

Tuomas Forsberg, "From Ostpolitik to 'Frostpolitik': Merkel, Putin and German Foreign Policy towards Russia," *International Affairs*, vol. 92, no. 1 (2016): 21-42.

Judy Dempsey, "Germany, Dump Nord Stream 2," *Carnegie Europe*, January 25, 2016, retrieved from <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/62567>.

### Recommended:

Gert Krell, "West German Ostpolitik and the German Question," *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 28, no. 3 (1991): 311-323.

Bastian Giegerich and Maximilian Terhalle, "The Munich Consensus and the Purpose of German Power," *Survival*, vol. 58, no. 2 (2016): 155-166.

Marco Siddi, "Germany Foreign Policy towards Russia in the Aftermath of the Ukraine Crisis: A New Ostpolitik?" *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 68, no. 4 (2016): 665-677.

## **L23: The China Factor**

The United States has a powerful geopolitical interest in getting Russia to balance against China, a reversal of its Cold War strategy of using China to balance against the Soviet Union. This session examines the state of the Sino-Russian relationship. Is Russia a viable partner for the United States against China? What tensions exist in the Sino-Russian relationship?

### Required Reading:

Alexander Kovolev, "On the Verge of Alliance: Contemporary China-Russia Military Competition," *Asian Security*, vol. 30, no. 1 (2017): 114-132.

Samuel Charap, John Drennan, and Pierre Noël, "Russia and China: A New Model of Great-Power Relations," *Survival*, vol. 59, no. 1 (2017): 25-42.

### Recommended Reading:

**Recall: no class will be held in the week after the lecture on Germany.**

## **L. 20: Crisis Simulation I**

## **L. 21: Crisis Simulation II**

## **L. 22: Closing Session: Post-Crisis Debrief and Discussion of Future Trends**

You must fill out an online survey that will be posted online soon after the crisis simulation is over. This survey will gauge your attitudes towards the process of negotiations at the North Atlantic Council and towards your fellow allies. I will process the results of this survey for our closing session.